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The Freedom from Self-Incrimination—A
Strasbourg-Proof Approach? Cases C-466/19 P
Qualcomm and C-481/19 P DB v Consob
Marc Veenbrink∗
Judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm v Commission,
C-466/19P, EU:C:2021:76, and Judgment of 2 February
2021, DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa
(Consob), C-481/19, E EU:C:2021:84
The Court of Justice of the European Union conformed
and clarified in Qualcomm, the well-established scope
and application of the freedom from self-incrimination;
in DB v Consob, it ruled that this principle is applied
in conformity with case law of the European Court of
Human Rights and made a distinction between undertak-
ings and natural persons.
I. Legal context
On 28 January 2021 and 2 February 2021, the Court
of Justice (CoJ) of the European Union (EU) ruled in
two cases on the freedom from self-incrimination. The
first case, Qualcomm, was an appeal case brought before
the CoJ by the undertaking at stake, whereas the sec-
ond case, DB v Consob, concerns a preliminary reference
procedure. The Qualcomm case also touches upon other
aspects, such as the right of the Commission to request
additional information after the statement of objections
has been issued (see in particular paras 66–70). The focus
of this contribution will be on the implications of the




In 2010, the Commission started an investigation into
an alleged predatory pricing practice of Qualcomm. The
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Commission issued an infringement decision in this case
in 2019 (Qualcomm (Case AT.39711) Commission Deci-
sion of 18 July 2019). The case at hand relates to a decision
taken on 31 March 2017 ordering Qualcomm to provide
certain information, after Qualcomm refused to comply
with a request for information on the basis of Article 18(2)
Regulation 1/2003. Qualcomm challenged the decision of
the Commission before the Union Courts.
B. DB v Consob
In DB v Consob, the CoJ had to rule on the scope of the
freedom from self-incrimination in proceedings relating
to insider dealing and market manipulation. The Ital-
ian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission, Con-
sob, started an investigation against a natural person for
insider trading and fined the person concerned e50.000
for delaying to come to a hearing and for failure to provide
certain information when he was present at the hearing.
Since the investigation is based on national law imple-
menting a Directive, the national court decided to refer




Both the General Court and the CoJ dismissed the argu-
ments of Qualcomm relating to the freedom from self-
incrimination by referring to the ruling in the (perhaps
infamous) Orkem case. In Orkem, the CoJ ruled that
the Commission may ‘compel an undertaking to provide
all necessary information concerning such facts as may
be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such
documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even
if the latter may be used to establish, against it or another
undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct’
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34). By contrast, the Commission cannot order an under-
taking to provide answers that may involve an admission
of guilt (Orkem, para 35).
The information that Qualcomm had to provide
was merely of a factual nature (para 145; and General
Court in: Case T-371/17 Qualcomm v Commission,
EU:T:2019:232, paras 187–189). Qualcomm also had to
produce documents containing some of the information
requested by the Commission. According to the under-
taking at stake, this would infringe the freedom from self-
incrimination, since the Commission can only compel
an undertaking to provide pre-existing documents and
thus, a contrario, cannot compel an undertaking to
create new documents. Both Union Courts rejected this
argument (CoJ, paras 146–147 and GC, paras 192–193).
It may be necessary for an undertaking to put factual
information into writing and to send that document to
the Commission in order to comply with the obligation to
cooperate. The freedom from self-incrimination will only
be infringed in those circumstances when an undertaking
has to produce documents containing an admission of
guilt.
Qualcomm confirms and clarifies established case law
of the Union Courts and is in that regard nothing new
under the sun. However, the established application of the
freedom from self-incrimination in competition law does
become interesting in light of the possible consequences
following from the DB v Consob ruling.
B. DB v Consob
In DB v Consob, the CoJ had to rule for the first time
on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination for
natural persons. The CoJ referred to ample case law of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order
to explain the scope and application of the freedom from
self-incrimination. This is a logical approach due to the
requirement in Article 52(3) of the Charter to provide at
least the same level of protection as the ECHR rights when
those rights correspond with Charter rights. Even though
the freedom from self-incrimination is not explicitly
referred to in Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR has regarded
this freedom to be part of the right to a fair trial (ECtHR,
Funke v France, CE:ECHR:1993:0225JUD001082884,
para 44). This also means that the freedom from self-
incrimination is part of the right of a fair trial under the
Charter (para 37).
The CoJ ruled that, with reference to case law of
the ECtHR, the ‘right to silence cannot reasonably be
confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing
or to remarks which directly incriminate the person
questioned, but rather also covers information on
questions of fact which may subsequently be used in
support of the prosecution and may thus have a bearing
on the conviction or the penalty imposed on that person’
(para 40). This is a notable distinction with the approach
taken in competition law proceedings initiated by the
Commission. According to the CoJ, this statement does
not necessarily conflict with that approach, since (1) the
Commission cannot oblige an undertaking to provide an
admission of guilt (para 47) and (2) the Orkem ruling
is applicable to (associations of) undertakings and not
natural persons (para 48). Both reasons are discussed
below.
IV. Practical significance
It is not uncommon in EU law to make a distinction
between natural and legal persons with regard to the
scope and application of certain fundamental rights. In
the 2003 Volkswagen case, AG Colomer made a distinc-
tion between safeguards in criminal law and in competi-
tion law by reference to the nature of the accused in both
procedures. Applying the same safeguards for individuals
in criminal law proceedings to ‘powerful corporations
with significant resources’ in competition law proceed-
ings would, amongst others, be a ‘mockery’ to individuals
(Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-338/00 P Volkswa-
gen v Commission, EU:C:2002:591, para 66). Directive
2016/343 also makes a distinction between natural and
legal persons when it comes to the scope and application
of the freedom from self-incrimination (Directive (EU)
2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects
of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be
present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ
L65/1). The Union legislator decided to limit this directive
to natural persons, since there are ‘different needs and lev-
els of protection of certain aspects of the presumption of
innocence as regards natural and legal persons’ (Directive
2016/343, Preamble, Recital 13; the freedom from self-
incrimination is regarded to be part of the presumption
of innocence, see Preamble, Recital 25). Reference is also
made to case law of the CoJ that ‘recognised that the
rights flowing from the presumption of innocence do not
accrue to legal persons in the same way as they do to
natural persons’ (Directive 2016/343, Preamble, Recital
13). In legal literature, however, different views exist as
to whether the scope and application of freedom from
self-incrimination can differ depending on the nature of
the accused (see, for a short overview, Marc Veenbrink,
Criminal Law Principles and the Enforcement of EU and
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In DB v Consob, the AG made a distinction between
the natural person in the case at hand and legal persons
in competition law proceedings (DB v Consob, AG
Pikmäe, para 96), whereas the CoJ correctly points to
the difference between natural persons on one hand and
(associations of) undertakings on the other (DB v Consob,
para 48). It is clear that an undertaking can be a natural
person as well. The ruling in DB v Consob, therefore,
leads to the question whether a natural person, acting
as an undertaking, should be treated differently from
a natural person acting in a different capacity. Should
the Commission then apply ECtHR case law or Orkem
when it orders a natural person, being the undertaking,
to provide information in a competition law procedure?
It is, furthermore, not clear as of yet whether the ECtHR
would actually make a distinction between the scope and
application of the freedom from self-incrimination in
light of the nature of the accused. Although, the ECtHR
did rule in Sa-Capital Oy that it is ‘mindful’ that in
competition law proceedings, fines are generally imposed
upon ‘corporate entities’ and not on natural persons
and took this into account as a factor to determine
whether the rights of defence were compatible with
Article 6 ECHR (see ECtHR, Sa-Capital Oy v Finland,
CE:ECHR:2019:0214JUD000555610, para 78).
The practical solution of the CoJ in DB v Consob to
distinguish between natural persons and undertakings is
perhaps a bit short-sighted. Nevertheless, the CoJ also
mentioned that Orkem, on its substance, does not nec-
essarily conflict with ECtHR case law, since undertak-
ings cannot be compelled to provide answers that might
involve an admission of guilt (DB v Consob, para 47). This
seems to be in contrast with the statement of the CoJ
that the ‘right to silence cannot reasonably be confined
to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks
which directly incriminate the person questioned, but
rather also covers information on questions of fact which
may subsequently be used in support of the prosecution
and may thus have a bearing on the conviction or the
penalty imposed on that person’ (DB v Consob, para 40).
In order to determine whether the freedom from self-
incrimination is infringed, and thus, whether there is
improper compulsion, the ECtHR will examine four
criteria, namely ‘the nature and degree of compulsion
used to obtain the evidence, the existence of any relevant
safeguards in the procedure, and the use to which any
material so obtained was put’ and the public interest
(ECtHR, O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom,
CE:ECHR:2007:0629JUD001580902, para 55; for a
discussion of these factors, see Veenbrink, cited above,
p. 24–31). The nature of the evidence requested can
be a factor that should be taken into account to deter-
mine the degree of compulsion that may be used
against a person. There are some cases in which the
ECtHR allowed authorities to obtain factual informa-
tion from a person (see e.g. ECtHR, Weh v Austria,
CE:ECHR:2004:0408JUD003854497, paras 52–56; and
O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, para 62). These
are cases concerning traffic violations in which the owner
of the car was obliged to inform the authorities who drove
the car. The owner of the car could, obviously, also be the
driver of that particular car. Answering the question could
therefore lead to the driver’s conviction. The ECtHR used,
amongst others, the nature of the evidence obtained and
the general interest at stake as relevant factors to conclude
that the obligation to state this simple fact did not infringe
the freedom from self-incrimination. On the basis of
these cases, it could be argued that a request for factual
information in competition law proceedings does not
necessarily infringe the freedom from self-incrimination.
On the other hand, the obligation on undertakings to
provide factual information goes further than merely
stating a simple fact. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that
the ECtHR will find this obligation to be an infringement
of the right to silence and thus an infringement of a core
aspect of the freedom from self-incrimination. Still, the
Strasbourg Court has shown that it takes into account
the particularities of competition law proceedings when
it determines whether there is an infringement of Article
6 ECHR (Sa-Capital Oy v Finland, cited above, paras 78
and 85).
The ECtHR is probably more lenient when it comes
to an obligation to provide documents that are already in
existence, as long as the Commission does not engage
in fishing expeditions and as long as the request is
sufficiently specific for the undertaking to determine
which documents it needs to hand over (see, respectively,
ECtHR, J.B. v Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2001:0503JUD0031
82796, para 69 and Funke v France, cited above,
para 44).
It is clear from the Qualcomm case that the Orkem
approach is still alive and kicking. This begs the question
whether that approach is indeed, as the CoJ held in DB v
Consbob, Strasbourg-proof. The answer to that question
remains in a similar state as Schrödinger’s cat. Hopefully,
the ECtHR will be presented a possibility in the near
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